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THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN A CRIMINAL
TAX EVASION OR FRAUD CASE
PRIOR TO INDICTMENT
CARLTON J. HUNKE*
Each year several criminal indictments for tax fraud or evasion
.are returned in North Dakota by the Federal Government. There
are probably only .two or three attorneys in North .,Dakota -who
regularly defend the federal criminal tax case. at .the trial level,
There are many more attorneys who may be involved earlier in
the development of a criminal tax case, during the invetigation
prior to indictment. This article concerns: itself with thIe -de elop-
ment -of a criminal tax case. prior to -the indictmeAt. 'Often "this
is theC time when, as a practical matter, knowledgeable couikl is
nost important. This article will .present what steps should be "con-
sidered and taken in order to preserve an effective defense.'
The most crucial stage of the defense case often occurs before
iTdictnent. The pioblems irn-this' area are often nt known by
attorneys because at this stage, the proceedings are administrati"e
iather than criminal. The various stages of the' investigatin 'by
the Government will be presented first aid then the problems that
.may' arise for 'defense' counsel will be discussed. Sinc.e the problems
tha tmay be encountered encompass constitutional rights under thie
Fourth,. Fifth' and Sixth Amendments, it' is important that -both
sides .are well prepared so that on the' one' hand pr eiou's rights: of
the taxpayer -are not waiIved. and 'so that on the othei hand years
of'-invesfigd6tion ahd preparation and 'the7 justified conviction,'itself
are not unavailing because of the unwitting denial of constitutional
rights by an unknowledgeabIle or over-zealous agent.
INVESTIGATION
The investigation of 'a taxpayer: bythe Internal ,Revenue Service
for possible criminal violations of the' federal tax -laws is generally
a lengthy process often requiring two years or. more. Occasioniallv.
* 'J.D.,' cum laude 1967, University of' North Dakota; Law Clerk for'Judge Charles
J. Vogel; associate with law firm of Wattam, Vogel, Vogel and Peterson, Fargo,' North
Dakota.
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a taxpayer is investigated criminally without a prior civil audit of
his returns. Such an investigation might be the result of a tip by
an informer who is seeking a financial reward or personal revenge.
Generally, however, a criminal tax case results after a revenue
agent has made a routine audit and finds irregularity, either in
the taxpayer's return or in his records, which irregularities cause
the agent to suspect that there has been tax evasion or fraud.
The agent classifies and notes these discrepancies and reports his
conclusions to his group chief. If the group chief concurs in the
agent's suspicions, the agent is directed to present the matter to
the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service. This div-
ision is the "F.B.I." of the Internal Revenue Service. If the Intel-
ligence Division agrees that an investigation is indicated, it assigns
an Intelligence agent-the special agent-to the case. This special
agent and the revenue agent, who first brought the case to light,
conduct the investigation together.
These two agents start a wide-ranging investigation interview-
ing persons, but concentrating primarily on public or private rec-
ords, such as bank statements, stock brokerage records and in-
surance company records. During this investigation, generally after
it is well underway, a letter may be sent by the special agent
to the taxpayer informing him that he is under investigation for
violation of the tax laws.
In the course of the investigation, the taxpayer will be called
in and after being given a limited warning of his constitutional
rights, he will be questioned.' The Supreme Court has held that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect statements made by a
taxpayer in custody when the taxpayer has not been given the
Miranda warnings.2 The Eighth Circuit has held that a taxpayer
is not entitled to be warned of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights in a non-custodial tax investigation interviewA The Supreme
Court's refusal to grant certiorari suggests that there will be no
expansion of Miranda into these pre-custodial interviews regardless
1. "At the initial meeting with a taxpayer, a Special Agent is now required to identify
himself, describe his function, and advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be
used against him. The Special Agent will also tell the taxpayer that he cannot be com-
pelled to incriminate himself by answering any questions or producing any documents, and
that he has the right to seek the assistance of an attorney before responding." I.R.S. News
Release, I.R.-949, Nov. 26, 1968.
2. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). See Lipton, Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 293, 323 (1968).
3. Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943
(1969). The other circuit courts that have considered the question have also refused to
apply Miranda to pre-custodial interviews. See Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558
(1st Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Marcus, 401 P.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1968) ; United States v.
Mancuso, 378 F.2d 612 (4,th Cir. 1967), modified, 387 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Maus, 378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Mansfield 381 F.2d 961
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967). See United States v. Lackey, 413 F.2d
655 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Contra, United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
LAWYERS AND CRIMINAL TAX EVASION
if conducted by a special agent or revenue agent and regardless
of the technical "stage" of the proceedings.
After they have concluded their investigation, the revenue agent
and the special agent each write a report. The revenue agent's
report deals with accounting matters and tax liability, while the
special agent's report deals with criminal violations and the evidence
establishing them. The special agent and the revenue agent have
broad discretion to dismiss the criminal aspects of a case while
they are in charge. 4
The reports of the agents are forwarded to the regional counsel
of the Internal Revenue Service. The taxpayer is often advised by
the regional counsel that a criminal prosecution has been recom-
mended. The taxpayer is afforded the opportunity to meet with the
regional counsel and, if he can convince the regional counsel that
the revenue agent and the special agent are wrong, the matter
is at an end. It is obviously difficult to learn the ratio of taxpayers
successfully convincing the regional counsel that the agents were
wrong. Even if the taxpayer does persuade the regional counsel to
drop criminal prosecution, the revenue agent would no doubt still
file a deficiency assessment against the taxpayer.
The regional counsel, after this conference with the taxpayer,
forwards the special agent's and revenue agent's reports to the
Internal Revenue Service in Washington, with his endorsement rec-
ommending prosecution. The Washington office reviews the case
and if it believes that criminal charges should be pressed, it for-
wards the file to the Assistant Attorney General of the United
States in charge of tax prosecutions. The taxpayer is usually given
another opportunity at this point to confer with the Department of
Justice and attempt to convince them that there should be no
criminal prosecution. The taxpayer may actually request such a
conference and usually obtains it, merely by writing a letter to the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of criminal tax prosecutions.
If the Department of Justice, through the Assistant Attorney
General, believes that a crime has been committed, the file is
then referred to the United States Attorney for the district in which
the taxpayer filed his return or has his residence. The United
States Attorney, at this point, has complete control of the case
and if he declines to present the matter to the grand jury, no
criminal prosecution will follow. Generally, the United States At-
torney does submit the case to the grand jury and on his recom-
mendation, the grand jury returns the indictment. Of course, since
the grand jury generally sits only twice a year, the indictment
4. Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34, 35 n,3 (8th Cir. 1968).
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may not follow until six months from the date the matter is first
referred to the United States Attorney. 5
AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS BY COUNSEL
It is apparent that the sooner the taxpayer's counsel is brought
into the case the better. Both the taxpayer and his counsel will
be at an extreme disadvantage if they do nothing until after indict-
ment. The intermediate stages prior to indictment are critical
times. If counsel cannot avoid prosecution of the taxpayer, he can
be gathering evidence and laying the foundation for a successful
defense.
Some actions should be taken regardless of whether the tax-
payer wants to cooperate with the investigation. Indeed they should
be taken routinely so that an intelligent decision on cooperation
can be made.
POWER OF ATTORNEY
The first action taken should be the immediate filing of a power
of attorney. The Internal Revenue Service regulations require that
such a power be filed.6 In addition, the filing has many practical
benefits which result from placing counsel between the taxpayer
and the governmental authorities. As a practical matter, the special
agent should be provided with a copy of the power of attorney along
with a request that all communications to the taxpayer be made
through the attorney.
RETAIN AN ACCOUNTANT
The average attorney knows as much about accounting as the
average politician knows about the hydrogen bomb. The attorney
should, therefore, determine the name of the taxpayer's accountant,
if he has one, and the attorney should, in most cases, retain an
accountant. The services of an accountant may be necessary
to compute the taxpayer's net worth or to analyze the past income,
expenses and the taxpayer's records. The accountant can also act
as a translator for the attorney so that he may present the technical
accounting material in a manner that the attorney and a jury can
both understand. While the type of tax fraud case that arises in
North Dakota may not always be as complicated as that which
5. For sources of information ooncerning the procedural aspects of the tax investiga-
tion, see generally Ross, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Tax Evasion and Fraud
Oases, 54 A.B.A.J.. 1102 (1968) ; Lofts, Procedural Aspects of Tax Fraud, 45 TAXES 508
(1967); Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966).
6. 26 C.F.R. § 601.503 (1969).
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might arise in Washington, D. C., or Miami Beach, the accountant's
services should not be overlooked. From the start of the investi-
gation, the Government has had two agents working on the case,
both of whom may be accountants or at least very competent in
that field. Often the accountant is needed to put the taxpayer's
books in some sort of order and determine what accounting method
has been used by the taxpayer.
The method of retaining the accountant is important. The at-
torney must be careful to retain the accountant in a manner that
will enable the taxpayer to claim the protection of -the attorney-
client privilege for the accountant's work papers and for any dis-
closures the taxpayer or the attorney make. to the accountant. The
Government may successfully subpoena -these -materials from the
accountant unless the accountant is retained or. the disclosures to
the accountant are inade fi such a manner that the 6ttorney-client
privilege is preserved..
North Dakota has no statute granting privilege for accountant-
client transactions. It is clear that in the absence of a statute
granting such a privilege, no accountant-client privilege exists for
communications -to an accountant.' -Any -privilege that is to be
attached in the absence of statute, therefore, must be derived from
the attorney-client relationship.
In Himmelfarb v. United States, s the taxpayer's attorney in-
formally employed an accountant. over the telephone. The court
assumed that the accountant was the attorney's agent but held that
the disclosures made by the taxpayer at meetings between the at-
torney, the accountant and the taxpayer were not within the privilege
because the accountant's presence was a mere convenience and
not indispensible in order for the client to communicate with his
attorney and thus ", . . secure, the client's subjective freedom of
consultation.' ".9 The court also hel d, that no privilege would attach
to communications made by the taxpayer to the attorney, and then
disclosed by the attorney to the accountant where, at the time he
made the disclosures to the attorney, the taxpayer knew the at-
torney had retained an accountant because, in that situation, the
taxpayer would have "... impliedly authorized the attorney to
make-'disclosures to the'third person.!"10  .
In United States v. 'Kovel,"1 Kovel was an accountant employed
by a law firm specializing in tax law. Kovel was subpoenaed to
7. See generally Annot., 38 A.L.P.2d 670 (1954).
8. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
9. Id. at 939. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2311 (3rd ed. 1968).
10. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir.-1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949).
11. 296 F.2d 918 (Ad Cir. 1961).
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testify against a client of the law firm at a grand jury. The court
held that where the taxpayer communicates first to his own ac-
countant, no privileges attach. But where the taxpayer consults
with a lawyer with his own accountant present to assist in the
consultation, or where the client communicates with his attorney
through an accountant retained by the attorney as a listening post,
the privilege attaches. 12 Specifically disagreeing with the language
in Himmelfarb, the court stated:
Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some
lawyers in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in
some cases. Hence the presence of an accountant, whether
hired by the lawyer or by the client, while the client is
relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not
to destroy the privilege, . . . the presence of the accountant
is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective
consultation between the client and the lawyer which the
privilege is designed to permit. By the same token, if the
lawyer has directed the client, either in the specific case
or generally, to tell his story in the first instance to an
accountant engaged by the lawyer, who is then to interpret
it so that the lawyer may better give legal advice, communi-
cations by the client reasonably related to that purpose
ought fall within the privilege; . . . 13
In United States v. Judson,1 4 the taxpayers learned that they
were under investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. They
employed an attorney who advised them that he would require a
net worth statement in order to carry on an adequate representa-
tion. The taxpayers then retained two accountants to prepare the
statement. The court held, without mentioning the fact that the
taxpayers and not the attorney had retained the accountants, that
the Government could not subpoena the work papers, computations,
memoranda and accounting worksheets prepared by the accountants
which culminated in the net worth statement. The court held these
documents constituted confidential communication within the attor-
ney-client privilege stating:
This statement was prepared at the attorney's request, in
the course of an attorney-client relationship, for the purpose
of advising and defending his clients. The accountants' role
was to facilitate an accurate and complete consultation be-
tween the client and the attorney about the former's finan-
cial picture.15
12. It is clear, however, that the accountant's presence must be necessary to clarify
information supplied by the client and to assist the attorney in advising the client. Cf. In
re Bretto, 231 F. Supp. 529 (D. Minn. 1964).
13. United States V. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
14. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
15. Id. at 462.
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A North Dakota attorney testified that he retained an accountant
and sent the taxpayers over to talk to the accountant because: "I
didn't understand accounting well enough to do the accounting angle
myself and I wanted to retain Mr. Orser to assist me by doing
accounting work for me so that I could properly advise [my
clients] . . . ."16 Thereafter, a special agent served a summons
on petitioners requiring the accountant to bring to the special agent
all of the documents the taxpayers had turned over to the accountant
and all of the accountant's work papers. The court held that the
accountant was the attorney's agent and that his services were
necessary in order for the attorney to properly advise his client
so that the attorney-client privilege applied to all communications
between the taxpayer and the accountant.
With the exception of the Himmelfarb decision, the language
and holdings of these cases suggest broad protection based upon
the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel where the accountant's
services are essential to the attorney's adequate representation of
the taxpayer. Generally, an accountant's services are essential to
an adequate representation of the taxpayer and the careful attorney
can bolster the Sixth Amendment protection by drafting a written
employment contract with the accountant. The attorney should retain
the accountant directly by written agreement and pay him directly.
The written agreement should state that the accountant is being
retained for the purpose of facilitating communications between the
taxpayer and the attorney and that the accountant is acting as the
attorney's agent in receiving information from the taxpayer. In
order to avoid any dispute as to whether the accountant's work
papers, drafts, and computations are the property of the accountant
or the client or the attorney, the written agreement should carefully
specify that the accountant's work papers are the property of the
attorney. This contract should also specify that the accountant shall
not testify without the written consent of the attorney or a valid
final order of court following the expiration of all rights of appeal.
INCRIMINATING DOCUMENTS
The Internal Revenue Service has been given sufficiently broad
subpoena powers to determine the tax liability of any person "to
examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be
relevant or material. . . ."- These subpoenas are enforceable in
the district court in which the person subpoenaed resides or is
found. 18 This subpoena power, however, is subject to the taxpayer's
16. Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. N.D. 1966).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1964).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 7604 (1964).
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constitutionalt right ;against. self-incrimination. A problem-that- should
be :anticipated by. the. attorney, 'therefore, is ,hoiv the- taxpayer'S
Fifth Amendment privilege can be-most effectively and:legitimately
:utilized- to prevent .production of -incriminating documents' including
those possessed by third parties.. Title and -possession'of -documefits
,containing incriminating -staterents is" sufficient for -the- taxpayer
-to- claim- the privilege.19. Even though the taxpayer has- title, how-
ever,. .he'-may not be -able to -prevent one- in possession of incriminat-
-ing documents from producing then for the Government,2 ° Prompt
-action. should' be -taken to recoverall' of- the 'taxpayer's papers- id
-records: in, the 'hands -:of third persons. A special problem'concdrns
ithose ,incriminating documents'- ,in the hands of third 'persons -in
which the third person has 'an :ownership interest. :The documents
most.:often 'sought of- this nature are work papersiised by -the ac-
countant- :in preparing the '-taxpayer's:-incoie tax 'returns.21 Such
work -.papers -are -generally:- considered- the' acountart's- po'6perty
and if they -remain in his-possession the Government may success-
fully .subpoena. them.from :the -accuntant2 - . ' :'-: - -
-" Its not'entirely .clearfrpm ' th dses whateffective actidncanbe taken by'the attoiney or taxpayer t, irecovei -6i effectively fretai
-and claim'"the privilege to incriminating documents in wich third
"partS eclalh 'a n-oWnership interest after, the cimmmal ivestigation
In United States v. ..Cohen,2 th'e defendants' accountant, Berke,
had, in, his, possession,. work papers. pertaining- to accounting, services
provided Cohen. onJuly.8, 1964, two special agents.asked Cohen
for. his., records pertaining to his tax;.liability. for .the. years ,1958
through 1963. Cohen told'the, agents. his accountants. had those rec-
.ords. The next day Cohen,.jo urneyed from Las Vegas-to his account-
ant's office -in, Beverly .Hills. to*- request- and, obtain the: work. papers
fr'om Berke.,. Four. days later,,one of the. special, agents, ,requested
ihe work palipers from Berke. Berke, .at this, special. agent's. insistence,
19. United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Application of House,
144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal.:1956)" " -" -
20. "A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production....
[iI]f-the documentary confession ,comes to.a third hand ali ointuitu, as this did, the use of
it in 'courf "does' hot "compel'the defendant to be a witness against himself." Johnson v.
,United States, 228.U.S. 457, 458-59 (1913) (Mr. Justice Holmes) ; Ufnited'States-V.-'Cohen ,
388 F.2d 464,' 468 n.9 (9th Cir. 1967)..
'-'21.* A recurring problem in -this area is defining what are the acaountant's work'papers
and what.constitutes the taxpayer's-property. In United States v.'Zakutansky? 4,01 F.2d 68,
71 (7th Cir 1968), th6'court tat'ed:" 'W ork papers' tme ans *any papers 'where you have
records recorded'on it and the -common form of workpap ers are: the"Cultmnar'c6lumn' pa-
per.' Memorandum sheets could be Work papers and 'it might be almost anything from the
pay rbooks'showing i'icomeor expenditures' " " ' - '- .. ... - -"
22. United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Boc-
cuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D. N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Fal-
1sone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).-See generally-Annot.; 90 A.L.R.2d 784
(1963).
23. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).--- -- --- --.. "
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requested Cohen to return the work papers but Cohen refused.
Cohen refused to comply with a subpoena to produce the work
papers on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him.
The district court quashed the summons which had been served on
Cohen to compel him to produce the work papers. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit in a decision by Judge Browning, held that possession,
not title, was the key to claiming the privilege stating:
Possession of potentially incriminating documents is thus the
necessary and sufficient condition of the privilege, for the
compelled production, identification and authentication of
incriminating materials by the possessor will incriminate
him, whether or not the documents are his. 24
The court rejected the Government's contention that the Fifth
Amendment privilege did not apply because the papers were owned
by another who had the right to demand their return. The court
rejected the Government's argument further that Berke's request
to return the papers rendered Cohen's possession "wrongful" and
therefore insufficient to support a claim of privilege. The court
stated:
The exercise of governmental power which the privilege was
intended to bar occurs whenever, without more, a person is
compelled to identify, authenticate, and produce documents
which may tend to incriminate him. 25
The court also rejected the Government's contention that Cohen
should be denied the privilege against self-incrimination as to the
accountant's work papers because those documents were prepared
by the accountant for his own use and therefore "did not constitute
the personal private papers of the privilege-claimant. ' '2 6 Finally the
court stated:
We hold that as a general rule the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination permits a person in possession
of potentially incriminating papers to decline to produce
them in response to a summons; that the exception estab-
lished by the Supreme Court's decisions in Wilson and White
is limited to the records of impersonal organizations; and
that if any other exceptions exist, based either upon the
character of the papers or the nature of the claimant's
possession, there is none which would bar assertion of the
privilege by a claimant who is in possession, with the con-
sent of an accountant, of work papers created by the ac-
24. Id. at 468.
25. Id. at 470.
26. Id.
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countant from information supplied by the person claiming
the privilege. 27
Under the broad grant of Fifth Amendment privilege to third
party documents possessed by the taxpayer in Cohen, it should
make no difference that the accountant or the taxpayer knew the
work papers were sought by the Government at the time the
accountant transferred possession to the taxpayer. Should the ac-
countant's "moral obligation" to provide the work papers to the
Government rather than to the taxpayer bar the taxpayer's assertion
of the privilege? The Seventh Circuit has recently held that it
should. In United States v. Zakutansky,28 the taxpayer's accountant,
after twice frustrating subpoenas to produce his work papers used
in preparing the taxpayer's income tax return, turned his work
papers over to the taxpayer. Subsequently, subpoenas were served
on both the accountant and the taxpayer to produce the work papers.
The accountant was unable to comply because he no longer held
the papers. The taxpayer claimed that since he had possession, the
papers were privileged. The court held that at the ". . . critical
time, when the subpoena of the Internal Revenue Service was
served on Zakutansky, the papers being sought were not in the un-
limited and rightful possession of the taxpayer. ' 29 Since the papers
were transferred when the accountant was under at least a moral
obligation to provide them to the Government, the papers were not
in the " . . indefinite and rightful possession of the taxpayer. .... -. o
The issue was not raised, and the court did not discuss, whether
the taxpayer could have successfully claimed the privilege had he
gained title and possession to the papers by purchasing them from
the accountant.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has not had this
precise question before it. In Bouschor v. United States,3 1 the Gov-
ernment conceded that Bouschor had rightful indefinite possession
of the work papers and the primary issue was whether the tax-
payer's attorney could claim the Fifth Amendment privilege on
behalf of the taxpayer. Even so, the decision by Judge Blackman
in Bouschor suggests that the Eighth Circuit's decision in that case
was influenced in part by the fact that the attorney, at the time
he requested the work papers, probably knew that the taxpayer
was under criminal investigation. His request that the taxpayer's
papers be turned over to the attorney could not " . .. in itself serve
to thwart investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. ' 3 2 This
27. Id. at 472.
28. 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968).
29. Id. at 72-73.
30. Id. at 72.
31. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
32. Id. at 459.
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language suggests that the court would be more inclined to follow
the Zakutansky rather than the Cohen reasoning.
If one is to faithfully follow the Zakutansky decision, it appears
unlikely that the taxpayer or his attorney could effectively gain
possession of incriminating documents owned by third parties and
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege. Even if the taxpayer or his
attorney are farsighted enough to gain rightful possession of the
incriminating documents from the owners, the cases are split as
to whether the taxpayer can claim the privilege after being served
by a subpoena to produce them and after having been requested
by the third party to return the papers.
In Deck v. United States,.3 the taxpayer's attorney requested
the taxpayer's accountant to turn over the accountant's work papers
relating to services he had performed on the taxpayer's books to
the attorney. The accountant was apparently unaware of any in-
vestigation and it was apparently conceded that the taxpayer gained
possession of the papers rightfully. The accountant was later sub-
poenaed to produce the work papers. The accountant twice made
demands upon the taxpayer's attorney to return the papers so that
the accountant could comply with the subpoena, but the attorney
refused. The Internal Revenue Service then issued a subpoena to
the attorney for the work papers. At the enforcement hearing, the
taxpayer took the stand, claimed the papers as his property and
asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. The taxpayer
claimed that since he acquired possession rightfully, he could prop-
erly invoke the privilege. The court held that at the time the Gov-
ernment sought production neither the taxpayer nor his attorney
could rightfully retain the papers stating:
We think that one who holds papers against the owner's
demands for their return cannot resist production by claim-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination.3 4
In Cohen, the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the argument
that production of the work papers could be compelled from the
taxpayer's possession after the accountant had made a formal re-
quest for their return from the taxpayer. Even in Cohen, however,
the court noted that so long as the accountant retained title to
the papers, there would be nothing to bar an accountant from suing
to recover possession from the taxpayer and turning the papers
over to the Government.3 5 The obvious motivations for an accountant
33. 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965).
34. Id. at 740-41. See also In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961).
35. United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1967). Of course, the accountant
also has a right to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege if the work papers might tend to
incriminate him.
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to sue for possession, such as vindication for unpaid services or
cooperation to gain forgiveness for able assistance in the taxpayer's
alleged fraud, all suggest that, if possible, the accountant's owner-
ship interest should be removed.
It has been suggested that a written sale agreement for the
documents is the ultimate solution.3 6 It is difficult to see how the
mere fact that the accountant and taxpayer have executed a written
contract would have any practical effect on the result in Zakutansky
where the court's decision was based upon the fact that it considered
the possession "wrongful" because the accountant and the taxpayer
violated a "moral obligation" in transferring possession to the tax-
payer after learning of the Government's interest in the documents.
Realistically, a sale, which no doubt would be conveniently termed
a sham, should have no effect if one is to faithfully follow the
spirit of Zakutansky.3 7
The answer lies, perhaps, in the fact that Zakutansky is poor
constitutional law. Possession, whether "rightful" or "wrongful" or
"indefinite" or "definite" should have no effect on the taxpayer's
ability to attach the privilege to his present possession. The court's
reasoning in Cohen is the best constitutional law and finds impres-
sive support from Judge Learned Hand. He stated:
For instance, suppose that A., knowing that B. has papers
which would incriminate him, gets wrongful possession of
them from B., whom they do not incriminate. If B. is con-
tent, and leaves A. in possession, I do not understand that
it would be any answer whatever to A. to say: 'You cannot
keep these back, because you came by them wrongfully,
or at least you have no right to them now.' All the law
considers is whether A. has got possession in fact, and
whether the documents actually will tend to incriminate
him. To get them in evidence the law would have to force
him to bring them out of a possession which is good enough
against any one but B. Certainly, I can find nothing in the
books which suggests such a distinction, and it contradicts
the whole history of the matter. For the privilege runs along
side by side with the power to compel production, and that
power depends only upon serving the actual possessor. There
are cases to be sure where one having custody is not re-
quired to produce, but it is only because his custody is so
subordinate as not to justify his meddling with documents
even to bring them to court. Certainly, a full possessor of
the documents is always subject to subpoena, whether his
possession is lawful or unlawful, and regardless of owner-
ship.3 8
36. Lofts, Procedural Aspects of Tax Fraud Investigations, 45 TAXES 508, 512 (1967).
37. United States v. Baldridge, 281 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex. 1968), vacated as moot,
406 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. In re Grant, 198 F, 708, 709 (S.D. N.Y. 1912), alf'd, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
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Regardless of the ultimate result reached when the conflict
between the circuits in this area is resolved, the attorney should
urge the taxpayer to do everything he can to gain rightful possession
of all incriminating documents. As to those documents in which a
third party might have a basis for claiming an ownership interest,
the attorney should draft a written sale agreement covering the
documents and the agreement should be executed for at least a
nominal consideration transferring title and possession to the tax-
payer. Even if the attorney or taxpayer already have such papers,
the sale agreement should still be executed to remove the ownership
interest. At the very least an executed agreement will bar a
disgruntled or nervous accountant from suing for possession and
turning the documents over to the Government.
CLAIMING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
A question closely associated with whether the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment privileges attach to incriminating documents is whether
the taxpayer must himself assert the privilege. It is certainly true
that an attorney can waive his client's constitutional rights. Sur-
prisingly, however, there is a split of authority concerning whether
an attorney can assert the taxpayer's constitutional rights when
documents incriminating to the taxpayer are subpoenaed from the
attorney's possession. When the accountant turns his work papers
over to the taxpayer's attorney and the Government then attempts
to subpoena these documents from the attorney, may the attorney
successfully refuse production because to do so would violate the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination on the part
of the taxpayer? The Eighth Circuit has held that the attorney
cannot assert the privilege on behalf of the taxpayer because the
guaranty against self-incrimination is a "personal" privilege.39 The
same result has been reached in the Sixth Circuit although in that
case the court would probably have compelled production even if
the taxpayer himself claimed the privilege because the possession
was merely "temporary. ' 40
The Supreme Court has indeed stated that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a "personal" privilege, but not in the context
that it could not be raised by an attorney on behalf of his client,
but in the context that it could not be asserted by an "impersonal"
corporation .41
39. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
40. In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961). See also United States v. Boccuto,
175 F. Supp. 886 (D. N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860- (3d Cir. 1959).
41, See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906)
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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In United States v. Judson, the Ninth Circuit held that the
attorney could assert his client's Fifth Amendment privilege to resist
production of documents from the attorney's possession which in-
criminated the taxpayer. 42 In Judson, the taxpayers turned over
to their attorney cancelled checks and bank statements and there-
after the Government issued a subpoena to the attorney directing
him to produce those items before the Grand Jury.43 The court
rejected the Government's contention that the attorney could not
assert the privilege noting that it was a non sequitur to say that
the privilege was "personal" and therefore could not be asserted
ny the attorney on behalf of his client. The court stated further:
Clearly, if the taxpayer in this case, . . . had been sub-
poenaed and directed to produce the documents in question,
he could have properly refused. The Government concedes
this. But instead of closeting himself with his myriad tax
data drawn around him, the taxpayer retained counsel.
Quite predictably, in the course of the ensuing attorney-
client relationship the pertinent records were turned over
to the attorney. The Government would have us hold that
the taxpayer walked into his attorney's office unquestionably
shielded with the amendment's protection, and walked out
with something less. The way was clear, according to ap-
pellant, for an enforcement officer to gather up the evi-
dence which otherwise would have been beyond his reach.
44
The Second Circuit has also indicated that an attorney can
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of his client and
thus resist production of incriminating documents within the at-
torney's possession but not within the attorney-client privilege.
4 5
Until the Eighth Circuit decision is overruled, however, the
attorney in the Eighth Circuit will have difficulty successfully claim-
ing the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of his client in enforce-
ment proceedings where the client is not a party or when production
of the papers demanded by the Government would not violate the
attorney-client privilege.4 6 When the attorney is subpoenaed to pro-
duce documents in his possession incriminating to the taxpayer, the
taxpayer should intervene in the enforcement proceedings and claim
the privilege.4 7
In Bauer v. Orser,48 Judge Register allowed an attorney to
42. 322 F.2d 4.60 (9th Cir. 1963).
43. The Government's demand that the attorney produce the work papers of an ac-
countant retained by the taxpayer to assist in preparing a net worth statement, which the
taxpayer's attorney required to adequately represent the client, was rejected because those
work papers constituted a confidential communication within the attorney-client privilege.
44. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1963).
45. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962).
46. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458 (8th Cir. 1963).
47. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964), discussed further infra.
48. 258 F. Supp. 338 (D. N.D. 1966).
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claim the privilege on his client's behalf during enforcement pro-
ceedings against the taxpayers' accountant where the attorney had
been expressly directed and authorized to do so by the taxpayers'
letter to the attorney in which they affirmatively claimed their
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. At the enforce-
ment hearing, the letter was admitted as an exhibit. The court
considered the appearance by the taxpayers' attorney and the filing
of the letter as an exhibit as substantially the same as intervention
by the taxpayers stating:
By virtue of Exhibit A, the Court has had its attention
called to the fact that Petersons have asserted-and do as-
sert-their constitutionally guaranteed privilege against self-
incrimination, with regard to the production of subject rec-
ords and documents.49
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE SUMMONS
In addition to the broad powers it has to examine books and
records, the Internal Revenue Service may also examine witnesses,
including the taxpayer, under oath. 50 The Supreme Court has re-
cently held that these code provisions for administrative summons
and interrogation do not per se violate the Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ment. 51 This is true even though the summons may be used to
obtain information for a subsequent criminal prosecution so long
as there is a possible civil liability to which the summons might
relate.5 2 If the sole objective of an investigation is to obtain evi-
dence for use in a criminal prosecution, this purpose is not legitimate
and enforcement will be denied.53
RESPONSE AND CONTEST OF SUMMONS TO TAXPAYERS
The procedure for responding and contesting the Internal Rev-
enue Service summons was considered by the Supreme Court in
the case of Reisman v. Caplin.54 Only those procedures allowed by
the Reisman decision will be effective to contest the summons. A
misstep here could result in the taxpayer being held in contempt
or criminally prosecuted for his illegal resistance.
49. Id. at 345.
50. The special agent's authority to issue the administrative summons is conferred by
the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1964). JudiCial enforcement of such summons is con-
ferred by 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1964).
51. Justice v. United States, 390 U.S. 199 (1968).
52. United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Pikeville, 274 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Ky. 1967),
aff'd sub. nom. per curiam, Justice v. United States, 390, U.S. 199 (1968) ; Daly v. United
States, 393 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1968) ; Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966).
53. United States v. Powell, 378 U.S. 48 (1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440
(1964) ; Wild V. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966). See Lipton, Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Tax Investigation, 45 F.R.D. 293 (1968).
54. 375 U.S. 440 (1964,).
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The individual summoned must appear at the time and place
designated in the summons and there present any objections to the
summons that he may have such as improper service or constitu-
tional privileges.55 Once having appeared and having stated his
objections to the summons, the taxpayer can refuse to produce the
various documents that may have been requested and he can refuse
to give any testimony. No criminal or quasi-criminal action can be
taken against a witness who appears at the hearing and refuses
in good faith to answer questions or produce documents. 56 Only if
the person summoned "neglects to appear" before the Hearing
Officer may he be criminally prosecuted.5 7 The summary enforce-
ment measures may be applied only to those persons who "wholly
make default or contumaciously refuse to comply."5 8
If the witness or taxpayer refuses to cooperate and testify
under the summons, the agent, generally through the United States
Attorney, must seek an enforcement order in the district court.
The United States Attorney files a petition to enforce the Internal
Revenue summons in the district court. The district court then
orders the witness or taxpayer to appear and to show cause why
he should not be compelled to obey the summons. At this hearing,
all objections to the summons can be raised. If the district court
orders compliance with the summons, that order is an appealable
one. 59 Indeed, the only method of attacking the enforcement order
is to appeal that order to the court of appeals. The witness or
taxpayer cannot refuse compliance with the enforcement order and
then attempt to collaterally attack the enforcement order on appeal
from the resulting contempt conviction.6 0 Only a failure by the
witness or taxpayer during the enforcement proceedings to obey a
district court order will subject the witness or taxpayer to any
possible penalty. If the district court does hold a witness in contempt
for his continuing refusal to answer questions, the witness can
obtain a stay of execution and appeal the contempt ruling to the
court of appeals. 1
There is obviously great potential for delaying the investigation
and criminal process simply by tying up the summons enforcement
proceedings with appeals. Only when his final appeal from the
contempt proceedings is unsuccessful need the taxpayer concern
55. A motion by the taxpayer to quash the summons is no longer an appropriate meth-
od of contesting the summons. Lesser v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. N.Y. 1964).
56. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 7210 (1964).
58. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 448 (1964). 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b) (1964).
59. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) ; Bouscher v. United States, 316 F.2d
451 (8th Cir. 1963).
60. See Daly v. United States, 393 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1968).
61. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) ; Daly v. United States, 393 F.2d 873 (8th
Cir. 1968).
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himself with complying or going to jail. In one recent case, a tax-
payer tied up the investigation in this manner for nearly two years
even though he missed one round of appeal by neglecting to seek
reviews of the enforcement order.6 2
UTILIZE DISCOVERY PROCESS BEFORE COMPLYING WITH SUMMONS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become effective if en-
forcement proceedings of the administrative summons are sought
by the Government. 3
This period during enforcement proceedings is probably the best
opportunity for the taxpayer to institute effective discovery proceed-
ings under the liberal discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The discovery process, however, cannot be used to ob-
struct and delay the enforcement proceeding. The rules contemplate
that in any particular enforcement proceeding, the court may modify
or limit the applicability of the Federal Rules. 64 Thus, the scope
of discovery is discretionary with the district judge along with the
time to be allowed for taking depositions and concluding discovery.
The basis for limiting discovery, however, is not to speed up the
enforcement proceedings but to prevent the taxpayer from obstruct-
ing those proceedings. The concern of the district judge over whether
the discovery process will delay the enforcement proceedings must
be balanced with the right of the taxpayer to a meaningful adver-
sary hearing. "The standard, as we see it, is that [the] taxpayer
must be afforded a meaningful adversary hearing of legitimate chal-
lenges."6 5 The trend is to allow sufficient time for broad discovery
depositions.
Along with the taxpayer's answer to the Government's com-
plaint to enforce the Internal Revenue Service summons, the tax-
payer can attach his interrogatories to the Government. 66 The tax-
payer is also entitled to take the depositions of the special agent
and the revenue agent.6 7 While this is a new area, certainly the
discovery can include all issues raised by the pleadings. In Kennedy
v. Rubin,6 1 the court allowed the taxpayer to depose the special
agent on the following issues:
1) What is the chief purpose of the investigation?
62. Daly v. United States, 393 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1968).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (3). See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964).
64. See 1946 Committee Note. 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 91 81.01[6] (2d ed. 1968).
See also United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1969).
65. United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969) ; accord, United States
v. Hayes, 408 F.2d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1969).
66. United States v. Nunnally, 278 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Tenn. 1968).
67. Id.; United States v. Moriarty, 278 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Wis. 1967) ; Kennedy v. Ru-
bin, 254. F. Supp. 190 (N.D. I1. 1966).
68. 254 F. Supp. 190, 194 (N.D. li. 1966).
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2) Has a good faith determination been made that a second
examination is necessary?
3) Does the Internal Revenue Service already have in its
knowledge and possession the information it seeks?
4) Was this investigative proceeding instituted to obtain
evidence against respondent for use in a criminal prose-
cution? 69
It is apparent that one of the primary considerations in deter-
mining whether the taxpayer will cooperate with the Government
in its investigation and appear and answer questions in accordance
with the Internal Revenue Service summons is that by his coopera-
tion, the taxpayer will waive, in effect, the broad discovery process
that will be open to him if the Government determines to seek
enforcement proceedings. It would appear to be a rare case where
the benefits of cooperation will outweigh the benefits of discovery
that could result during the subsequent enforcement proceedings if
the taxpayer determines not to cooperate.
CONTESTING SUMMONS TO THIRD PARTY-
INTERVENTION AND RESISTANCE
It is to be expected that during the investigation third parties
will be subpoenaed to appear before the special agent and testify
and produce records. For example, a summons could be directed
to the treasurer of a corporation with which the taxpayer has a
close relationship directing the treasurer to testify before the agent
and produce the "books and records, cancelled checks, minute books
and stock books" relating to the operation of the corporation. The
Internal Revenue Service is probably not required to give the tax-
payer advance notice of the examination of the third party where
none of the materials sought belongs to the taxpayer or represents
his attorney's work product10 What action can the taxpayer take
if he does learn of the investigation?
The Supreme Court, in two decisions, has allowed the third
party to intervene and contest the summons and production. 1 In
the Reisman case which concerned individual taxpayers, the Court
stated:
Both parties summoned and those affected by a disclosure
may appear or intervene before the District Court and chal-
lenge the summons by asserting their constitutional or other
claims. 2
69. Id.
70. ,See In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
71. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) ; Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
72. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
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The Court stated further:
In addition, third parties might intervene to protect their
interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party to the
summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may intervene.7 8
The circuits have not consistently applied Reisman in allowing
the taxpayer to contest the summons directed to third parties. In
Justice v. United States, where the summons was directed to two
banks and called for the production of certain bank records relating
to transactions between the banks and the individual taxpayers,
the Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayers were entitled to intervene
and raise constitutional challenges to the production along with
challenges based upon their rights and privileges under the various
Internal Revenue statutes.7 4 In Application of Cole, where the sum-
mons directed the bank to produce its records and files concerning
transactions with the individual taxpayers, the Second Circuit held:
The taxpayer, under circumstances where only books, rec-
ords and other papers belonging to the third party are the
subject of the summons, has no standing to object to the
summons.
7 5
The court felt these facts brought the case outside of the reach of
the holding in Reisman. The First Circuit has agreed that the tax-
payer has no standing to object to a summons directed to a bank.7 6
Citing Cole, the Eighth Circuit in a case charging that defendant
did by use of the mails in the offer and sale of securities unlawfully,
wilfully and knowingly employ a scheme to defraud, held that the
defendant had no standing to assert Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights with respect to summoned bank records.7 7
In United States v. Bank of Commerce, the Third Circuit held
that the taxpayer had standing to raise Fourth Amendment objec-
tions to a summons by the Internal Revenue Service upon a bank
to produce bank records relating to transactions between bank and
taxpayer. 78 In United States v. Benford, the Seventh Circuit held
that the taxpayer could intervene and contest a summons directed
to the treasurer of a corporation to which the taxpayer was closely
connected which directed the treasurer to produce books and records
relating to the operation of the corporation.7 9  Referring to the
decisions in Powell and Reisman, the court stated:
73. Id. at 449.
74. 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1966).
75. 342 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
76. O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1966).
77. Dosek v. United States, 405 F.2d 405, 409 (8th Cir. 1968).
78. 405 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1969).
79. 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th dir. 1969).
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The opinions did not expressly, and, as we read them, did
not impliedly, limit the taxpayer's right to intervene in
enforcement proceedings to situations where a legally pro-
tected interest in the records could be shown. Had the
court intended simply to hold that the particular interests
of the taxpayers involved in those cases were sufficient bases
for intervention, the opinions would doubtless have made
that evident. We interpret them as adopting the judicial
policy with respect to I.R.S. inquisitorial summonses that
the person whose tax liability is the subject of the investi-
gation can intervene and challenge enforcement if he sees
fit. 0
The language and result of Benford is the necessary result of
a faithful application of the Reisman decision. While it can be
argued that the intervention will ultimately serve no purpose other
than delay, that does not justify denying intervention in every case
and thus prevent an adversary hearing of the privileges and rights
claimed.
Where the summoned party indicates an intention to voluntarily
comply with the summons, it will be unavailing for the taxpayer
to attempt to quash or bring some other action in an attempt to
avoid enforcement of the summons."1 The court in Reisman sug-
gested that the taxpayer's procedure was to "restrain" the witness
from complying, thereby forcing the commissioner to bring an en-
forcement action. In such enforcement proceedings, the taxpayer
could then intervene. As a practical matter, while the court in
Reisman apparently was referring to non-judicial action by the
taxpayer, the restraint could also be accomplished by bringing an
action to enjoin the third party from complying with the summons.
That action and the Government enforcement action could then
later be consolidated.8 2
TRANSCRIPT OF EXAMINATION
The Internal Revenue Service has a stenographer present to
transcribe all of the examination of the summoned witness or tax-
payer. Only after the witness or taxpayer has signed the transcrip-
tion, however, do the Internal Revenue Service regulations allow
the taxpayer or witness to be given a copy of this testimony.
The attorney should consider, therefore, bringing his own stenog-
rapher or court reporter to record the examination. There is, how-
80'. Id.
81. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) ; Chakejian v. Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.
Pa. 1969).
82. See Chakejian v. Trout, 295 F, Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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ever, a split of authority over the question of whether an attorney
is entitled to have his own reporter transcribe the examination.
One district court has held that a witness is not entitled to bring
his own stenographer nor is that witness entitled to be represented
by the same lawyer that represents the taxpayer . 3 Another district
court decision has agreed that the witness or taxpayer is not en-
titled to have his own stenographer present at the examination.S4
This decision, however, held that the policy of the Internal Revenue
Service in refusing to provide the witness or taxpayer a copy of
the transcript of the examination is unwarranted and contrary to
the Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, while the court refused
permission for the witness to have his own stenographer present
at the examination, the court ordered that the witness be given a
copy of the transcript of the examination even though the witness
refused to sign the original copy of the transcript. A third dis-
trict court decision has allowed the witness to bring his own
stenographer to the examination.8 5
Certainly the taxpayer or witness should avoid making any state-
ment while not required to do so by a proper summons. The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act does not apply to volunteered state-
ments.86 The taxpayer can thus be denied copies of his voluntary
statements prior to his indictment. Of course, after the indictment
or information has been filed, the taxpayer is entitled to move
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
production of his volunteered statements. 87
CONCLUSION
This article has presented some of the most obvious and neces-
sary actions any attorney should take on behalf of any client who
is under an investigation that could lead to criminal indictment by
the Internal Revenue Service. The most important goal of the at-
torney at this point should be the preservation of constitutional
rights. Opportunities to meet informally with the Internal Revenue
Service should be used to explain the taxpayer's position and remove
the possibility of criminal indictment.
The attorney should be well-informed of the most effective
means of claiming all of his client's rights. He should also be pre-
pared to intervene in any subpoena directed to the taxpayer's bank
or other third parties.
83. Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952).
84. In re Neal, 209 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. W.Va. 1962).
85. Mott v. MacMahon, 214 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
86. See United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 820-21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 828 (1962).
87. United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
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Finally, while each case will be different, the attorney should
have in mind that if he recommends that his client cooperate with
the Internal Revenue summons, the client will likely be waiving
an opportunity for extensive discovery procedures. The discovery
work at this stage can be invaluable during any later criminal trial.
